The influence of Cartesian philosophy both in England and in France, together with the funding of the Royal Society and the Académie des Sciences, facilitated a considerable rise in the use of the term ‘law of nature’ during the seventeenth century. Such laws, referring to natural phenomena rather than to the moral order, were first posited by Descartes as explanatory devices to account for many of the divergent facets of nature. Much has been said about the development of this notion, its intellectual and philosophical lineage having been traced from medieval mathematical rules and theological discussions about divine power to sociological features of late-renaissance monarchical governance. A great deal of scholarship has, furthermore, been devoted to the characterisation of this notion as something imposed by God, explanatory of nature’s regular behaviours, and capable of expression in mathematical terms.

On the other hand, not much research has been directed to understanding the uses to which this term was employed in previous centuries. This paper will address an instance in the late sixteenth century, in which a circumscribed group of scholars engaged in a theological discussion used this very terminology. Discussing the real presence of the body of Christ in the Eucharist and related issues, Robert Bruce (1554-1631), moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, Catholic theologian William Rainolds (1544-1594), and Cambridge professor of divinity William Whitaker (1548-1595) employed the metaphor ‘laws of nature’ in a post-Scholastic framework as divine mandates, assuming them to have an explanatory role for both the ways of nature and of God. The terminology they included in their discussion ranged from ‘laws of nature’ and ‘of physics’ to ‘laws of God’ and ‘of theology’, always referring to laws regulating nature itself. Even though this terminology was not widespread, the locations and contexts in which it was used are significant for understanding its future ideational development. The thesis I intend to suggest is that these uses present an instance when this expression was employed – at least from the late-sixteenth century – as a theological explanatory device which later shifted to the realm of natural philosophy. I will also suggest that even though the notion existed in previous centuries, the contexts of natural philosophy were not amenable enough to accept it, while the theological grounds were more receptive for its use.