Francis Bacon codified what the later seventeenth century termed “experimental philosophy.” The success of Baconian reform required the union—Bacon calls it the “marriage”—of theoretical (or speculative) inquiry and an essential operative, or hands-on, approach. Incorporating “hands-on” as an equal partner in natural inquiry requires work, money, and time. In the aspirations of early modern experimental philosophers, the term “work” has a triple meaning. First, it registers the manual nature of experiment and the operative nature of the new knowledge. Second, it highlights the aim of this novel and hybrid approach to nature, viz. the production of works, that is, inquiry is given a utilitarian sanction. Third, to bring about the novel combination of contemplative and operative pursuits required great efforts—intellectual, practical and social. Thus, the term “work” covers the entire nexus of activities requisite for productive power. As a consequence, experiment itself takes on a hybrid existence between labour and leisure. The Baconian marriage signals a cultural shift where those actively pursuing natural philosophy become “working scientists.” Knowledge, effort, materials, tools, instruments, time and money are the essential ingredients of the new experimental philosophy. In the absence of these activities, mere philosophical (contemplative) claims about nature were considered chimerical, barren and time-wasting. In view of this emphasis on work and utility, the experimental philosophy faced several major obstacles. The first is evident in the term itself: “experimental philosophy” is a paradigmatic oxymoron formed out of the hitherto contradictory elements of manual work and contemplative philosophizing. Then, quite apart from methodological and theoretical criticisms, this hybrid enterprise could not avoid the social stigma of dirty hands and sweaty labour plus exorbitant expenditure of time and money. Also, not everyone possessed the necessary qualities, expertise, motivation and time to carry out the work, which could spread itself over many sites and command diverse skills. Through emphasizing the oxymoronic character of experimental philosophy, we bring a novel approach to the emergence of early modern science by problematizing the marriage of reason and experiment. Early modern virtuosi had to work at the marriage of experiment and philosophy. To avoid what Bacon termed “an inauspicious divorce” and to ensure a marriage productive of works, they had to overcome social and cultural tensions and seeming epistemic contradictions. Our symposium considers key seventeenth-century figures such as Bacon and Boyle as they struggle to overcome these tensions, up to eighteenth-century efforts on the part of Tschirnhaus, Franklin, Priestley, Cavendish and Hutton to respond to the challenges of experimental philosophies.