iCHSTM 2013 Programme • Version 5.3.6, 27 July 2013 • ONLINE (includes late changes)
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‘Not an hypothesis but most rigid consequence’: the location of authority in Isaac Newton’s natural philosophy
Jason Grier | York University, Canada

In 1672 Isaac Newton submitted to the Royal Society his “New theory about light and colours.” He was attempting to solve what he regarded as the fatal flaws contained in the optical theories that existed at the time; however, he had a grander ambition. In the “New theory” he challenged the authority of the Royal Society by suggesting and developing alternative conceptions of experimental credibility, mathematical certainty and knowledge dissemination to those proposed by Robert Boyle. Newton structured the “New theory” in a manner that was a conscious response to Boyle’s method. He presented his optical experiments in a failed effort to establish his authority and eliminate dissent. Insisting that experimental philosophers “not mingle conjectures with certainties,” he tried to purge from his writing all conjecture and information that he deemed not to be experimentally certain or relevant. Thus, he drew a sharp distinction between hypothesis and experimental facts.
My paper will focus on Robert Hooke’s response to Newton’s optical theory and the dispute between them that followed in order to demonstrate a fundamental difference between Boyle and Newton’s models of experimental philosophy. For Boyle it was only possible to establish that a fact was probably true. Authority was primarily a product of social status. Natural philosophy was to be done by gentlemen whose credibility—and by extension the credibility of their matters of fact—was found in their person. Newton rejected the position that a fact could only be established to be probably true; instead, he sought to present his experiments more along the lines of a mathematical proof. The event was irrelevant. What mattered was that an experiment was a repeatable incident that occurred outside of history. I suggest a vital difference between the methods of Boyle and Newton that is related to ‘objectivity.’ While Boyle located authority in the person doing and reporting the experiments, Newton placed the authority of his discoveries within the facts themselves. His were not credible because of his status, but because they were ‘objective’ statements about reality. I will argue that with the “New theory” Newton began a transformation so that the power of experimental facts no longer resided in gentility or even expert status per se; instead, facts were to be regarded as ‘objective’ statements about the world and they were visibly shown as such through public demonstration.