iCHSTM 2013 Programme • Version 5.3.6, 27 July 2013 • ONLINE (includes late changes)
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Artillery propellants and picric acid: mobilizing chemistry in two German explosives plants
Jeffrey Johnson | Villanova University, United States

To facilitate examining and comparing how chemical knowledge was “put to war” in explosives plants on opposing sides of the Western Front, this paper will treat two German cases. In large part chosen because of the availability of sources, these are a relatively small state propellants plant, Saxony’s Gnaschwitz State Powder Factory, and a high-explosives plant from the dye industry, Bayer’s picric-acid plant in Dormagen. Gnaschwitz exemplifies the dramatic expansion of propellants production in the aftermath of unexpected munitions shortages following the initial mobilization in 1914; Dormagen exemplifies German efforts to double explosives production as part of the Hindenburg Program or “second mobilization” under the impact of the “battle of materials” inaugurated by the British Somme campaign in 1916. Each type of production plant (propellants vs. high explosives, state vs. private, single- vs. dual-use) presented inherent challenges to efforts to maximize efficiency and output. Their locations also necessitated trade-offs (security vs. access to resources). Further complications arose from severe shortages of critical raw materials, requiring a search for substitutes or alternate paths to production, as well as the recovery and re-use of reagents and solvents. Works chemists and plant laboratories thus played important roles in providing innovative solutions to many of these problems. At the same time, shortages of German male workers, skilled and unskilled, presented additional security and management problems resulting from the use of prisoners, foreign workers, and women. By 1918 the inherent limitations and inefficiencies of the German system required trade-offs that sacrificed quality for greater quantity, ultimately contributing to the eventual German defeat. In the aftermath, the “chemical disarmament” provisions of the Versailles Treaty led to the forced dismantling of these plants, accompanied by mandated technology transfers to the Allies. Thus both sides learned lessons, albeit not the same ones, from the German experience.